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Abstract. Deep neural networks are known to be susceptible to ad-
versarial noise, which are tiny and imperceptible perturbations. Most
of previous work on adversarial attack mainly focus on image models,
while the vulnerability of video models is less explored. In this paper,
we aim to attack video models by utilizing intrinsic movement pattern
and regional relative motion among video frames. We propose an effec-
tive motion-excited sampler to obtain motion-aware noise prior, which
we term as sparked prior. Our sparked prior underlines frame corre-
lations and utilizes video dynamics via relative motion. By using the
sparked prior in gradient estimation, we can successfully attack a variety
of video classification models with fewer number of queries. Extensive
experimental results on four benchmark datasets validate the efficacy of
our proposed method.
Keywords: Video Adversarial Attack, Video Motion Information, Noise
Sampler.
1 Introduction
Despite the superior performance achieved in a variety of computer vision tasks,
i.e., image classification [11], object detection [24], segmentation [10,4], Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs) are shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks that
a well-trained DNN classifier may make severe mistakes due to a single invisible
perturbation on a benign input and suffers dramatic performance degradation.
To investigate the vulnerability and robustness of DNNs, many effective attack
methods have been proposed on image models. They either consider a white-
box attack setting where the adversary can always get the full access to the
model including exact gradients of given input, or a black-box one, in which the
structure and parameters of the model are blocked that the attacker can only
access the (input, output) pair through queries.
DNNs have also been widely applied in video tasks, such as video action
recognition [30,17], video object detection [36], video segmentation [31], video
inpainting [18] etc. However, limited work have been done on attacking video
models. A standard pipeline of video adversarial attack is shown in Fig. 1(a).
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Fig. 1. (a) A pipeline of generating adversarial examples to attack a video model. (b)
Loss curve comparison: i) Multi-noise: sample noise prior individually for each frame;
ii) One-noise: sample one noise prior for all frames; iii) Sparked prior (ours): sample
one noise prior for all frames and sparked by motion information. Loss is computed in
attacking an I3D model on Kinetics-400 dataset. The lower loss indicates the better
attacking performance. Our proposed sparked prior clearly outperforms (i) and (ii) in
terms of attacking video models.
Specially designed perturbations are estimated from prior, which normally is
random noise, and imposed on the clean video frames to generate the adversarial
examples. The goal is using the adversarial examples to trick the model into
giving a wrong prediction. Most literature [33,20] focus on the white-box attack
setting and simply transfer the methods used in image domain to video domain.
Recently [16] proposes a black-box attack method, which simply decodes a video
into frames and transfer gradients from an image pretrained model for each
frame. All the aforementioned methods ignore the intrinsic difference between
images and videos, the extra temporal dimension. This naturally leads to a
question: should we use motion information in video adversarial attack?
In this work, we propose to use motion information for black-box attack
on video models. In each optimization step, instead of directly using random
noise as prior, we first generate a motion map (i.e., motion vector or optical
flow) between frames and construct a motion-excited sampler. The random noise
will then be selected by the sampler to obtain motion-aware noise for gradient
estimation, which we term as sparked prior. In the end, we feed the original
video frames and the sparked prior to gradient estimator and use the estimated
gradients to iteratively update the video. To show the effectiveness of using
motion information, we perform a proof-of-concept comparison to two baselines.
One is initializing noises separately for each frame extending [13] (multi-noise),
the other is initializing one noise and replicating it across all video frames (one-
noise). We use the training loss curve to reflect the effectiveness of video attack
methods, in which the loss measures the distance to a fake label. As we can see
in Fig. 1(b), the loss of our proposed method drops significantly faster (orange
curve) than one-noise and multi-noise method, which indicates that we need
fewer queries to successfully attack a video model. This answers our previous
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question that we should use motion information in video adversarial attack. Our
main contributions can be summarized as follows:
– We find that simply transferring attack methods on images models to video
models is less effective. Motion plays a key role in video attacking.
– We propose a motion-excited sampler to obtain sparked prior, which leads
to more effective gradient estimation for faster adversarial optimization.
– We perform thorough experiments on four video action recognition datasets
against two models and show the efficacy of our proposed algorithm.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Attack. Adversarial examples have been well studied on image
models. [27] first shows that an adversarial sample, computed by imposing small
noise on the original image, could lead to wrong prediction. By defining a number
of new losses, [1] demonstrates that previous defense methods do not significantly
increase the robustness of neural networks. [22] first studies the black-box at-
tack in image model by leveraging the transferability of adversarial examples,
however, their success rate is rather limited. [12] extends Natural Evolutionay
Strategies (NES) to do gradient estimation and [13] recently proposes to use
time and data dependent priors to reduce queries in black-box image attack.
However, limited work have been done on attacking video models. In terms of
white-box attack, [33] proposes to investigate the sparsity of adversarial pertur-
bations and their propagation across video frames. [20] leverages a Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) to account for temporal correlations and generate
adversarial samples for real-time video classification system. [14] focuses on at-
tacking the motion stream in a two-stream video classifier by extending [8]. [5]
proposes to append a few dummy frames to attack different networks by optimiz-
ing specially designed loss. The first black-box video attack method is proposed
in [16], where they utilize the ImageNet pretrained models to generate a tenta-
tive gradient for each video frame and use NES to rectify it. More recently, [34]
and [37] focus on sparse perturbations only on the selected frames and regions,
instead of the whole video.
Our work is different from [16] because we leverage the motion informa-
tion directly in generating adversarial videos. We do not utilize the ImageNet
pretrained models to generate gradient for each video frame. Our work is also
different from [34,37] in terms of both problem setting and evaluation metric.
We follow the setting of [16] to treat the entire video as an integrity, instead of
attacking the video model from the perspective of frame difference in a sparse
attack setting. We use attack success rate and consumed queries to evaluate
our method instead of mean absolute perturbation (MAP). By using our pro-
posed motion-aware sparked prior, we can successfully attack a number of video
classification models using much fewer queries.
Video Action Recognition. Recent methods for video action recognition can
be categorized into two families depending on how they reason motion infor-
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mation, i.e., 3D Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [15,28,2,32,6] and two-
stream networks [25,7,30,21]. 3D CNNs simply extend 2D filters to 3D filters
in order to learn spatio-temporal representations directly from videos. Since
early 3D models [15,28] are hard to train, many follow-up work have been pro-
posed [2,23,29,6]. Two-stream methods [25] train two separate networks, a spatial
stream given input of RGB images and a temporal stream given input of stacked
optical flow images. An early [7] or late [30] fusion is then performed to combine
the results and make a final prediction. Although 3D CNNs and two-stream net-
works are two different family of methods, they are not mutually exclusive and
can be combined together. All aforementioned methods indicate the importance
of motion information in video understanding.
Based on this observation, we believe motion information should benefit video
adversarial attack. We thus propose the motion-excited sampler to generate a
better prior for gradient estimation in a black-box attack setting. By incorporat-
ing motion information, our method shows superior attack performance on four
benchmark datasets against two widely adopted video classification models.
3 Method
3.1 Problem Formulation
We consider a standard video action recognition task for attacking. Suppose
the given videos have an underlying distribution denoted as X , sample x ∈
RV×H×W×C and its corresponding label y ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} are a pair in X , where
V,H,W,C denote the number of video frames, height, width and channels of
each frame respectively. K represents the number of categories. We denote DNN
model as function fθ, where θ represents the model’s parameters. The goal
of a black-box adversarial attack is to find an adversarial example xadv with
imperceivable difference from x to fail the target model fθ through querying the
target model multiple times. It can be mathematically formulated as:
arg min
xadv
L(fθ(xadv), y)
s.t. ‖xiadv − xi‖ ≤ κ, i = 0, 1, ..., V − 1
#queries ≤ Q
(1)
Here i is the video frame index, starting from 0 to V − 1. ‖ · ‖ denotes the `p
norm that measures how much perturbation is imposed, and κ indicates the max-
imum perturbations allowed. fθ(x) is the returned logits or probability by the
target model fθ when given an input video x. The loss function L(fθ(xadv), y)
measures the degree of certainty for the input xadv maintaining true class y. For
simplicity, we shorten the loss function as L(xadv, y) in the rest of the paper since
model parameters θ remain unchanged. The goal is to minimize the certainty
and successfully fool the classification model. The first constraint enforces high
similarity between clean video x and its adversarial version xadv and the second
imposes a fixed budget Q for the number of queries used in the optimization.
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Fig. 2. (a): Overview of our framework for black-box video attack. i) Compute motion
maps from given video frames; ii) Generate sparked prior from random noise by the
proposed motion-excited sampler; iii) Estimate gradients by querying the black-box
video model; iv) Use the estimated gradient to perform iterative projected gradient
descent (PGD) optimization on the video. (b): Illustration of Motion-Excited Sampler.
To determine pixel value located in (1, 1) of rs, we first get motion value (4, 5) from
motion map m at its (1, 1) location. We then select pixel value located in (4, 5) of r
and put its value into location (1, 1) in rs.
Hence, the fewer queries required for adversarial video and the higher overall
success rate within κ perturbation, the better the attack method. The overview
of our method is shown in Fig. 2(a).
3.2 Motion Map Generation
In order to incorporate motion information for video adversarial attack, we need
to find an appropriate motion representation. There are two widely adopted mo-
tion representations in video analysis domain [25,30], motion vector and optical
flow. Both of them can reflect the pixel intensity changes between two adjacent
video frames. In this work, we adopt the accumulated motion vector [35] and
the TVL1 flow [3] as the motion representation. We first describe accumulated
motion vector as below.
Most modern codecs in video compression divide video into several intervals
and split frames into I-frames (intracoded frames) and P -frames (predictive
frames). Here, we denote the number of intervals as N and the length of an
interval as T . In each interval, the first frame is I-frame and the rest T − 1 are
P -frames. The accumulated motion vector is formulated as the motion vector of
each P -frame, that can trace back to the initial I-frame instead of depending on
previous P -frames.
Suppose the accumulated motion vector in frame t of interval n is denoted as
m(t,n) ∈ RH×W×2 and each pixel value at location i in m(t,n) can be computed
as:
m
(t,n)
i = i− B(t,n)i , 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 (2)
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where B(t,n)i represents the location traced back to initial I-frame from t-th frame
in interval n. We refer the readers to [35] for more details on accumulated motion
vectors.
For an interval with T frames, we can obtain T − 1 accumulated motion
vectors. We only choose the last one m(T−1,n) since it traces all the way back
to the I-frame in this interval and are most motion-informative. We abbreviate
m(T−1,n) as m(n) and thus, we have a set of N accumulated motion vectors for
the whole video, denoted as M = {m(0),m(1), ...,m(N−1)}.
Optical flow is a motion representation that similar to motion vector with
the same dimension RH×W×2. It also contains spatial details but is not directly
available in compressed videos. Here we use TVL1 algorithm [3] to compute the
flow given its wide adoption in video-related applications [30,2,6]. We apply the
same strategy as motion vectors to select optical flow and will also obtain N
flow vectors. The set of flow vectors is also denoted as M for simplicity.
3.3 Motion-Excited Sampler
In a black-box setting, random noise is normally employed in generating adver-
sarial examples. However, as stated before in Fig. 1(b), direct usage of random
noise is not promising in video attack. To tackle this problem, we propose to in-
volve motion information in the process of generating adversarial examples, and
thus propose motion-excited sampler. In this section, we describe the details of
the designed sampler.
First, we define the operation of motion-excited sampler (ME-Sampler) as
rs = ME-Sampler(r,m), (3)
where r ∈ RV×H×W×3 denotes the initial random noise, motion maps m ∈
RV×H×W×2 are selected without replacement from set M introduced in Sec-
tion 3.2. rs ∈ RV×H×W×3 will be the transformed motion-aware noise, which
we term as sparked prior afterwards.
To be specific, we use the motion-excited sampler to “warp” the random
noise by motion. It is not just rearranging the pixels in the random noise, but
constructing a completely new prior given the motion information. For simplicity,
we only consider the operation for one frame here and it is straightforward to
extend to the case of multiple frames. Without abuse of notation, we still use
r, rs,m for clarification in this section.
At the i-th location of the motion map m, we denote the motion vector
value as pi ∈ R2 and its coordinate is denoted (xi, yi), i.e., pi = m[xi, yi].
Here, pi = (ui, vi) has two values, which indicate the horizontal and vertical
relative movements, respectively. When computing the value of position (xi, yi)
in sparked prior rs, (ui, vi) will serve as the new coordinates for searching in
original random noise. The corresponding noise value of r[ui, vi] will be assigned
as the value in rs[xi, yi]. Thus, we have:
(ui, vi) = m[xi, yi],
rs[xi, yi] = r[ui, vi].
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Algorithm 1 Grad-Est(x, y, g, loop): Estimate `(g) = −∇g〈∇xL(x, y), g〉.
Input: video x, its label y, number of frame of video x is V . initialized g, interval t
for sampling new motion map, δ for loss variation and  for approximation.
1: if loop % t = 0 then
2: motion map m1,m2, ...,mV−1 are chosen from M = {m(0),m(1), ...,m(N−1)}
without replacement and are concatenated to be m;
3: end if
4: r ← N (0, I);
5: rs = ME-Sampler(r,m);
6: w1 = g + δrs;
7: w2 = g − δrs;
8: `(w1) = −〈∇xL(x, y),w1〉 ≈ L(x,y)−L(x+·w1,y) ;
9: `(w2) = −〈∇xL(x, y),w2〉 ≈ L(x,y)−L(x+·w2,y) ;
10: ∆ = L(x+w2,y)−L(x+w1,y)
δ
rs;
Output: ∆.
We give a simplified example in Fig. 2(b) to show how our motion-excited
sampler works. To determine pixel value located in (1, 1) of rs, we first get
motion value (4, 5) from motion map m at its (1, 1) location. We then select
pixel value located in (4, 5) of r and put its value into location (1, 1) of rs.
The insight behind our motion-excited sampler is that when we do sampling
and re-combination of selected pixels from random noise, we are incorporating
the key information from motion into the generated sparked prior. Since motion
information has been experimentally proved to be critical in distinguishing dif-
ferent actions, using sparked prior is likely to better identify the weakness of a
video model and largely improve the final attack performance.
3.4 Gradient Estimation and Optimization
Once we have the sparked prior, we incorporate it with the input video and feed
them to the black-box model to estimate the gradients. We consider `inf noise
in our paper following [16], but our framework also applies to other norms.
Similar to [13], rather than directly estimating the gradient ∇xL(x, y) for
generating adversarial video, we perform iterative updating to search. The new
loss function designed for such optimization is,
`(g) = −〈∇xL(x, y), g〉, (4)
∇xL(x, y) is the groundtruth gradient we desire and g is the gradient to be
estimated. An intuitive observation from this loss function is that iterative min-
imization of Eq. 4 will drive our estimated gradient g closer to the true gradient.
We denote ∆ to be the gradient ∇g`(g) of loss `(g). We perform a two-query
estimation to the expectation and apply the authentic sampling to get
∆ =
`(g + δrs)− `(g − δrs)
δ
rs, (5)
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Algorithm 2 Adversarial Example Optimization for `inf norm perturbations.
Input: original video x, its label y, learning rate h for updating adversarial video.
1: x0 ← x, initially estimated g0 ← 0, initial loop t = 1;
2: while arg max[fθ(xt)] = y do
3: ∆t = Grad-Est(xt−1, y, gt−1, t− 1);
4: gt = gt−1 − η∆t;
5: xt = xt−1 − h · sign(gt);
6: xt = Clip(xt,x0 − κ,x0 + κ);
7: t = t+ 1;
8: end while
Output: xt.
where δ is a small number adjusting the magnitude of loss variation. By substi-
tuting Eq. (4) to Eq. (5), we have
∆ =
〈∇xL(x, y), g − δrs〉 − 〈∇xL(x, y), g + δrs〉
δ
rs. (6)
In the context of finite difference method, we notice, given the function L at a
point x in the direction of vector g, the directional derivative 〈∇L(x, y), g〉 can
be transferred as:
〈∇xL(x, y), g〉 ≈ L(x+ g, y)− L(x, y)

, (7)
 is a small constant for approximation. By combining Eq. (6)-(7), we have,
∆ =
L(x+ w2, y)− L(x+ w1, y)
δ
rs, (8)
with w1 = g + δrs and w2 = g − δrs. The resulting algorithm for generating
gradient for g is shown in Algorithm 1.
Once we have Algorithm 1, we can use it to update estimated gradient and
optimize the adversarial video. To be specific, in iteration t, ∆t is returned
by Algorithm 1. We update gt by simply applying one-step gradient descent:
gt = gt−1 − η∆t, η is a hyperparameter to update gt. The updated gt is the
gradient we want to use for generating adversarial videos. Finally, we combine
our estimated gt with projection gradient descent (PGD) to translate our gradi-
ent estimation algorithm into an efficient video adversarial attack method. The
detailed procedure is shown in Algorithm 2, in which arg max[fθ(xt)] returns
top predicted class label, Clip(·) constrain the updated video xt close to the
original video x0, where x0−κ is the lower bound and x0 +κ the upper bound.
κ is the noise constraint in Eq. (1).
3.5 Loss Function
Different from applying cross-entropy loss directly, we adopt the idea in [1] and
design a logits-based loss. Here, the logits returned from the black-box model is
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Fig. 3. Examples of motion vectors in generating adversarial samples. In (a)-(d), the
first row is the original video frame, the second row is the motion vector and the third
row is generated adversarial video frame. a) Kinetics-400 on I3D: Abseling→Rock
climbing; b) UCF-101 on I3D: Biking→Walking with dog; c) Kinetics-400 on TSN:
Playing bagpipes→Playing accordion; d) UCF-101 on TSN: Punching→Lunges.
denoted as l ∈ RK , where K is the number of classes. We denote the class of
largest value in logits l as y, the largest logits value is ly. The final loss can be
obtained as L = max(ly−maxk 6=y lk, 0). Minimizing L is expected to confuse the
model with the second most confident class prediction so that our adversarial
attack could succeed.
4 Experiments
In this section, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of our proposed method
for video attacks against two widely adopted video classification models on four
benchmark video datasets.
4.1 Experimental Setting
Datasets. We perform video attack on four video action recognition datasets:
UCF-101 [26], HMDB-51 [19], Kinetics-400 [17] and Something-Something V2 [9].
UCF-101 consists of 13,200 videos spanned over 101 action classes. HMDB-51
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Table 1. Test accuracy (%) of the video models.
Model Kinetics-400 UCF-101 HMDB-51 SthSth-V2
I3D 70.11 93.55 68.30 50.25
TSN2D 68.87 86.04 54.83 35.11
includes 6,766 videos in 51 classes. Kinetics-400 is a large-scale dataset which has
around 300K videos in 400 classes. Something-Something V2 is a recent crowd-
sourced video dataset on human-object interaction which needs more temporal
reasoning. It contains 220,847 video clips in 174 classes. For notation simplicity,
we use SthSth-V2 to represent Something-Something V2.
Video Models. We choose two video action recognition models, I3D [17] and
TSN2D [30], as our black-box models. For I3D training on Kinetics-400 and
SthSth-V2, we train it from ImageNet initialized weights. For I3D training on
UCF-101 and HMDB-51, we train it with Kinetics-400 pretrained parameters
as initialization. For TSN2D training, we use ImageNet initialized weights on
all four datasets. On SthSth-V2, we use 8 segments following [21], and for the
other three datasets, we use 3 segments following [30]. At test time, we divide
each video to 10 segments for I3D and 25 segments for TSN2D on UCF-101,
HMDB-51 and Kinetics-400. For SthSth-V2, we use 2 segments for both I3D
and TSN. The test accuracy of two models on the four datasets can be found in
Table 1.
Attack Setting. In this work, we perform both untargeted attack and targeted
attack. Untargeted attack requires the given video to be misclassified to any
wrong label and targeted attack requires classifying it to a specific label. For
each dataset, we fix the random seed and randomly select one video from each
category following the setting in [16]. All selected videos should be correctly
classified by the black-box model. For all videos, we impose `inf noise on video
frames whose pixels are normalized to 0-1. We constrain the maximum pertur-
bation κ = 0.03, query budget Q = 60,000 for untargeted attack and κ = 0.05,
Q = 200,000 for targeted attack. If one video is failed to attack within these
constraints, we will record its consumed queries as the upper bound Q.
Evaluation Metric. We use average number of queries (ANQ) required in
generating effective adversarial examples and the attack success rate (SR) to
measure the attack performance. A smaller ANQ and higher SR is preferred.
4.2 Comparison to State-of-the-Art
We report the effectiveness of our proposed method across a variety of different
models and datasets in Table 2. We present the results of leveraging two kinds
of motion representations: Motion Vector (MV) and Optical Flow (OF) in our
proposed method. In comparison, we first show the attacking performance of V-
BAD [16] under our video models since V-BAD is the only directly comparable
method. We also extend two image attack methods [12,13] as strong baselines
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Table 2. Untargeted attacks on SthSth-V2, HMDB-51, Kinetics-400, UCF-101. The
attacked models are I3D and TSN2D. “ME-Sampler” denotes the results of our method.
“OF” denotes Optical Flow. “MV” denotes Motion Vector.
Dataset / Model Method
I3D TSN2D
ANQ SR(%) ANQ SR(%)
SthSth-V2
E-NES [12] 11,552 86.96 1,698 99.41
E-Bandits [13] 968 100.0 435 99.41
V-BAD [16] 7,239 97.70 495 100.0
ME-Sampler (OF) 735 98.90 315 100.0
ME-Sampler (MV) 592 100.0 244 100.0
HMDB-51
E-NES [12] 13,237 84.31 19,407 76.47
E-Bandits [13] 4,549 99.80 4,261 100.0
V-BAD [16] 5,064 100.0 2,405 100.0
ME-Sampler (OF) 3,306 100.0 842 100.0
ME-Sampler (MV) 3,915 100.0 831 100.0
Kinetics-400
E-NES [12] 11,423 89.30 20,698 71.93
E-Bandits [13] 3,697 99.00 6,149 97.50
V-BAD [16] 4,047 99.75 2,623 99.75
ME-Sampler (OF) 3,415 99.30 2,631 98.80
ME-Sampler (MV) 2,717 99.00 1,715 99.75
UCF-101
E-NES [12] 23,531 69.23 41,328 34.65
E-Bandits [13] 10,590 89.10 24,890 66.33
V-BAD [16] 8,819 97.03 17,638 91.09
ME-Sampler (OF) 6,101 96.00 6,598 97.00
ME-Sampler (MV) 4,748 98.02 5,353 99.00
to video to demonstrate the advantage of using motion information. They are
denoted as E-NES and E-Bandits respectively and their attacking results are
shown in Table 2.
Overall, our attack method using motion information achieves promising suc-
cess rates on different datasets and models. On SthSth-V2 and HMDB-51, we
even achieve 100% SR. On Kinetics-400 and UCF-101, we also get over 97% SR.
The number of queries used in attacking these models is also encouraging. One
observation worth noticing is that it only takes hundreds of queries to completely
break the models on SthSth-V2. On HMDB-51 against TSN2D, we need no more
than 900 queries as well. For the rest of models, we just consume slightly more
queries. To analyze this, we observe that models consuming slightly more queries
often have higher recognition accuracy from Table 1. From this observation, we
conclude that a model is likely to be more robust if its performance on the clean
video is better.
In terms of using motion vector and optical flow, we find that motion vector
outperforms optical flow in most cases, e.g., the number of queries used 5,353
(MV) vs 6,598 (OF) on UCF-101 against TSN2D. The reason is that motion
vector always has clearer motion region since it is computed by a small block
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Fig. 4. (a): Comparisons of targeted attack on SthSth-V2 with V-BAD: i) Average
queries consumed by I3D and TSN2D; ii) Success rate achieved by I3D and TSN2D.
(b): Comparisons of targeted attack on HMDB-51 with V-BAD: i) Average queries
consumed by I3D and TSN2D; ii) Success rate achieved by I3D and TSN2D.
of size 16× 16. However, optical flow is always pixel-wisely calculated. It is not
difficult to imagine that when the region used for describing is relatively larger, it
is easier and more accurate to portray the overall motion. When only considering
each pixel, the movement is likely to be lost in tracking and make some mistakes.
Compared to E-NES and E-Bandits, we achieves much better results, either
on consumed queries or success rate, i.e., when attacking a TSN2D model on
UCF-101, our success rate is 99.00%, which is much higher than 34.65% for
E-NES and 66.33% for E-Bandits. The query 5,353 is also much smaller than
41,328 and 24,890. When compared to V-BAD, our method also requires much
fewer queries. For example, we save at least 1,758 queries on HMDB-51, 1,330 on
Kinetics-400 and 4,071 on UCF-101 against I3D models. Meanwhile, we achieve
slightly better success rate 98.02% vs 97.03% on UCF-101, 100.0% vs 97.70% on
SthSth-V2.
Finally, we show the visualizations of adversarial frames on Kinetics-400 and
UCF-101 in Fig. 3. We note that the generated video has little difference from
the original one but can lead to a failed prediction. More visualization can be
found in the supplementary materials.
4.3 Targeted Attack
In this section, we report the results of targeted attack on dataset HMDB-51 and
SthSth-V2 in Fig. 4. For dataset SthSth-V2 from Fig. 4(a), our method consumes
less than 25,000 queries using either motion vector or optical flow. However, it
costs V-BAD 71,791 against I3D model and 52,182 against TSN2D model. The
success rate is about 6% higher in TSN2D model but with much fewer queries.
For dataset HMDB-51 against I3D from Fig. 4(b), we also outperform V-BAD
by saving more than 10,000 queries and achieve comparable success rate. For
TSN2D, we only require half of the queries as V-BAD consumes but achieves a
much higher success rate meanwhile, i.e., 92.16% vs 64.86%.
Combining with the untargeted results, we conclude that our method is more
effective in generating adversarial videos than the comparing baselines.
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Table 3. Compare to cases without introducing motion information.
Dataset / Model Method
I3D TSN2D
ANQ SR(%) ANQ SR(%)
Kinetics-400
Multi-noise 11,416 95.00 15,966 89.87
One-noise 8,258 96.25 8,392 96.25
Ours 3,089 100.0 2,494 100.0
UCF-101
Multi-noise 15,798 90.00 30,337 70.00
One-noise 22,908 93.33 16,620 90.00
Ours 6,876 100.0 8,399 100.0
Table 4. Comparison of motion map with two handcrafted maps.
Dataset / Model Method
I3D TSN2D
ANQ SR(%) ANQ SR(%)
Kinetics-400
U-Sample 10,250 96.25 9,166 96.20
S-Vaule 8,610 98.75 8,429 96.20
Our 3,089 100.0 2,494 100.0
UCF-101
U-Sample 13,773 93.33 17,718 83.33
S-Vaule 11,471 96.67 17,116 86.67
Our 6,876 100.0 8,399 100.0
4.4 Ablation Study
In this section, we first show the necessity of motion information and then demon-
strate that it is the movement pattern in the motion map that contributes to the
attacking. We also study the effect of different losses. Experiments in this section
are conducted on a subset of 30 randomly selected categories from UCF-101 and
80 from Kinetics-400 by following the setting in [16].
The necessity of motion information. As mentioned in Section 1, we evalu-
ate two cases without using motion information: 1) Multi-noise: Directly intro-
ducing random noise for each frame independently; 2) One-noise: Introducing
only one random noise and replicated to all frames. We record their perfor-
mance and compare to ours in Table 3. The results show that methods without
using motion are likely to spend more queries and suffer lower success rate. On
UCF-101 against I3D model, ’Multi-noise’ consumes queries more than twice as
our result and the success rate is 10% lower. On UCF-101 against TSN2D, it
has 30% drop on success rate for ‘Multi-noise’ and 10% drop for ‘One-noise’.
On Kinetics-400, the decrease of success rate is slightly alleviated for the two
methods but still, when against I3D model, ‘One-noise’ incurs nearly 3 times
more queries and ‘Multi-noise’ consumes nearly 4 times more queries. The query
consumed on TSN2D model is even worse that ‘Multi-noise’ has 6 times more
queries and ‘One-noise’ has almost 4 times queries. Such big gaps between meth-
ods without motion information and ours indicate that our designed mechanism
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Table 5. Comparison of losses based on Cross-Entropy, Probability, Logits.
Dataset / Model Method
I3D TSN2D
ANQ SR(%) ANQ SR(%)
Kinetics-400
Cross-Entropy 3,452 98.75 2,248 100.0
Probability 3,089 100.0 2,494 100.0
Logits 2,423 100.0 1,780 100.0
UCF-101
Cross-Entropy 17,362 80.00 17,992 73.26
Probability 13,217 90.00 14,842 81.19
Logits 6,876 100.0 6,182 100.0
to utilize motion information plays an important role in directing effective gra-
dient generation for improved search of adversarial videos.
Why motion information helps? In order to answer this question, we change
the pixel values in original motion map and replace with uniformly sampled
values and sequenced values.
We first define a region mapR, which is the same size of original motion map.
Its pixel values are 1 when the corresponding pixel in original motion map are
nonzero, the rest pixel values in it are set to be 0. We describe the two settings
here. “Uniformly Sample” (U-Sample): A new map U are created whose pixel
values are uniformly sampled from [0, 1] and scaled to [-50,50]. Region map R
and U are multiplied together to replace original motion map. “Sequenced Value”
(S-Value): A map S whose pixel valued are ranged in order starting from 0,1,2
from left to right and from top to bottom. Region map R and S are multiplied
together to serve as an replacement of original motion vector.
The results can be seen in Table 4. We first notice that ‘S-Value’ slightly
outperforms ‘U-Sample’. On Kinetics-400 against I3D, ‘S-Value’ saves more than
1,000 queries but gets 2% higher success rate. On UCF-101 against I3D, ‘S-
Value’ saves more than 2,000 queries but also gets 3% higher success rate. We
analyze the reason to be the gradual change of pixel values in ‘S-Value’, rather
than irregular change. As for our method, we can save nearly 3 times queries
compared to ‘S-Value’ and ‘U-Sample’, but achieves 3.8% higher success rate.
On UCF-101, at least 4,541 queries are not necessary and 6.77% on success rate
can be further improved with I3D. 9,319 queries are saved and 16.77% higher
success rate is obtained when compared to ‘U-sample’ against TSN2D. Through
such comparison, we can conclude that the movement pattern in motion map is
the key factor to improve the attacking performance.
Comparison of different losses. We study the effect of three different losses
for optimization here: cross-entropy loss, logits-based in Section 3.5. We further
transfer logits l to probability p by Softmax and construct probability-based loss:
L=max(
∑
k pk−maxk 6=y pk, 0), y is the class with the largest probability value.
From the results in Table 5, we conclude that logits-based loss always performs
better while the other two are less effective. We also observe that Kinectics-400
is less restrictive to the selection of optimization loss, compared to UCF-101.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the black-box adversarial attack on video models. We
find that direct transfer of attack methods from image to video is less effective
and hypothesize motion information between video frames plays a big role in
misleading video action recognition models. We thus propose a motion-excited
sampler to generate sparked prior and obtain significantly better attack perfor-
mance. We perform extensive ablation studies to investigate why motion works in
video attacking and demonstrate our superior performance over previous meth-
ods. We hope that our work will give a new direction to study adversarial attack
on video models and some insight to the difference of videos and images.
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A Implementation details
In terms of accumulated motion vector, we follow the setting in [35] and set each
interval T within a video to 12 frames. There is no overlap between two adja-
cent intervals. For each interval, we generate one accumulated motion map. In
adversarial attacking, we impose noises on original video frames which are nor-
malized to [0,1]. The modified videos are processed via standard ‘mean’ and ‘std’
normalization before inputting to the black-box model for gradient estimation.
Each iteration consumes three queries that two queries for ∆ in Algorithm 1 and
one to determine whether the updated video xt is successful in attacking. In the
untargeted attack setting, we set the query limit to 60,000 and the maximal iter-
ation for updating adversarial video is 20,000. In the targeted attack setting, we
set the query limit to 200,000 and the maximal iteration is 66,667 (200,000/3).
In Algorithm 1, the interval t for sampling new motion maps is 10, δ for
adjusting the magnitude of loss variation is 0.1,  for approximation is 0.1. In
Algorithm 2, learning rate η for updating estimated gradient gt is 0.1 and learn-
ing rate h for updating adversarial video xt is 0.025.
B More visualization
Demo video We first put together a video to showcase our generated adver-
sarial samples. The video can be found in MESampler-demo-video.mp4 .
Video and motion map visualization We also show more results of adversar-
ial video frames and the adopted motion vector on four datasets. Visualizations
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on SthSth-V2 [9] and HMDB-51 [19] are shown in Fig. 5 and the results of
Kinetics-400 [17] and UCF-101 [26] are in Fig. 6.
From the demo video and the frame visualizations on four datasets, we can
see that our generated adversarial samples can successfully fail the video classi-
fication model. Even though the generated video samples look the same as the
original videos and the true labels can still be recognized by human without any
difficulties.
Failure cases To have a better understanding of our model, we show several
failure cases of our method. Examples on Kinetics-400 and UCF-101 are shown
in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, respectively.
There are two potential reasons behind failures in adversarial videos. The first
one is about the confidence of attacked video model. On certain videos, the model
is confident about its prediction. Take the first video in Fig. 7 as an example, the
black-box model outputs its true label ‘golf driving’ with confidence 0.9999. This
confidence score is so high that the perturbation posed on the video is likely to
have little consequences on the final results. Secondly, it is about motion quality
in videos. We notice that for videos that we fail to attack, their motion map is
rather obscure and unrecognizable. Under such circumstance, the advantage of
motion information can not be fully utilized.
C Better motion information
Here, we justify another assumption that clearer and more completed motion
maps will lead to better attack performance. Rather than fixing the starting
point and length of each interval for generating motion map, the starting point
and the length of interval for generating motion maps is modified according to
the trajectory of given video to get clearer and more complete description of
movement. Such new map is termed as ‘improved motion map’. We show two
samples on Kinetics-400 in Fig. 9, that are from class ‘zumba’ and ‘vault’. The
left column are the video frames, ‘improved motion map’ and original motion
map are in the middle and right respectively. Clearly, improved motion map in
the middle is more consistent and clearer. For sample (a), it saves more than
10,000 queries by applying ‘improved motion map’ instead of original one. For
sample (b), 30,000 queries are also saved by using the ‘improved motion map’.
However, it is still difficult to automatically determine the starting point and
the interval length to generate much clearer maps. We will leave the study as
the future work.
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Fig. 5. Examples of motion vectors used in attacking and the generated adversarial
samples. In (a)-(d), the first row is the original video frame, the second row is the
motion vector and the third row is generated adversarial video frame. a) SthSth-V2 on
I3D: throwing a leaf in the air and letting it fall→ throwing tooth paste; b) HMDB-51
on I3D: throw → fencing; c) SthSth-V2 on TSN2D: pretending or trying and failing
to twist remote-control→ pretending to open something without actually opening it;
d) HMDB-51 on TSN2D: swing-baseball→ throw.
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Fig. 6. Examples of motion vectors used in attacking and generated adversarial sam-
ples. In (a)-(d), the first row is the original video frame, the second row is the mo-
tion vector and the third row is generated adversarial video frame. a) Kinetics-400 on
I3D: tango dancing→ salsa dancing; b) UCF-101 on I3D: StillRings→ PoleVault; c)
Kinetics-400 on TSN2D: tossing coin→ scissors paper; d) UCF-101 on TSN2D: Swing
→ TrampolineJumping.
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Fig. 7. Failed samples from Kinetics-400 against I3D and TSN2D. a) Sample from class
‘golf driving’ against I3D; b) Sample from class ‘presenting weather forecast’ against
TSN2D. The first row are the frames of original video and the second row are the
motion vectors generated between frames. The movements between video frames seem
to change little and the generated motion vectors are very obscure.
Fig. 8. Failed samples from UCF-101 against I3D and TSN2D. a) Sample from class
‘BasketballDunk’ against I3D; b) Sample from class ‘BreastStroke’ against TSN2D.
The first row are the frames of original video and the second row are the motion
vectors generated between frames. The movement between video frames changes little
and the target object in the video is very small.
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Fig. 9. Rather than fixing the starting point and length of each interval for generating
motion map, the start point and the length of interval for generating motion maps
is modified according to the trajectory of the given video to get clearer and more
complete description of movement. Two samples from Kinetics-400: a) Sample from
class ‘zumba’; b) Sample from class ‘vault’. Left: the frames of original video; Middle:
‘improved motion map’; Right: original motion map in attacking. Clearly, ‘improved
motion map’ is more complete and clearer than original motion map in the right. The
attacking results are also better by using the ‘improved motion map’.
